EU split over frozen Russian reserves

Euroclear, the Belgian central securities depository, holds roughly €185 billion of Russian central bank assets that have been immobilised in the European Union. This represents the bulk of an estimated €210 billion in Russian central bank reserves frozen across the bloc. The concentration of these assets at a single institution and in one jurisdiction places a significant share of legal and financial exposure on Belgium and on Euroclear.

These immobilised reserves remain a central element in European debates over how to support Ukraine’s financing needs. The size and location of the holdings make any decision on their future use highly consequential for Belgium’s financial system and for broader EU policy toward Russia.

At the European Council summit held on October 15–16, Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever opposed proposals to deploy the frozen Russian assets held at Euroclear for the benefit of Ukraine. His stance effectively blocked efforts at the summit that focused on using roughly €185 billion of Russian central bank reserves concentrated at Euroclear.

The dispute underscored concern in Brussels and other capitals that Belgium and Euroclear could face disproportionate legal and financial risks if these assets were actively used. The blockage at the summit illustrated how national-level risk assessments can shape collective EU decision-making on sanctions-related funds.

In response to the concentration of risk in Belgium, EU officials and commentators have discussed moving the Russian accounts out of Euroclear into an EU-managed instrument or custodian. The objective would be to reallocate legal exposure from a single member state and its market infrastructure to the European Union as a whole.

Such options are being considered as potential workarounds to the concerns raised by Belgium over unilateral liability. While no specific mechanism is reported as agreed, the discussions indicate a search for structures that would enable collective EU decisions on the reserves without overly burdening one country or institution.

Russian legal countermeasures have intensified, with Moscow courts issuing rulings or claims against Euroclear in the range of about $235–$249 billion. Euroclear has publicly rejected these rulings and is pursuing appeals and legal action in Belgium and Brussels to contest them.

These legal moves add another layer of risk for Euroclear, already at the centre of the frozen-assets dispute. The combination of large claims from Russian courts and unresolved EU-level decisions on asset use creates a complex legal environment for the Belgian depository and its stakeholders.

Last year, the European Union opted for a conventional joint €90 billion loan to support Ukraine instead of directly tapping frozen Russian central bank reserves. That decision left the underlying issue of how to handle the immobilised assets unresolved but maintained them as a potential resource for future mechanisms.

The current debates over Belgium’s exposure, possible EU-level custodial solutions, and Russian litigation show that the frozen reserves remain a recurring source of political, legal, and financial tension. How the EU ultimately balances support for Ukraine with the concentrated risks at Euroclear will shape the next phase of policy on these assets.