EU weighs tougher tools on China trade

China’s goods trade surplus with the European Union reached 360.6 billion euros in 2025, representing a 15% increase compared with 2024. The imbalance has continued to grow in 2026, with the EU-China trade gap expanding by about 10% year-on-year in the first four months of the year. These figures underscore the scale and persistence of the trade divergence between the two economies.

The growing surplus has intensified debate within the EU over how to respond to what many policymakers see as a structural imbalance in trade flows. Concerns focus on the impact on European industry and on the bloc’s dependence on Chinese goods in key sectors.

French President Emmanuel Macron has called for stronger defensive instruments to address the trade relationship with China. He has argued that “we must take protective measures, safeguard measures,” signalling support for a more assertive stance on trade remedies.

Macron has also urged the creation of “the European equivalent of Section 301,” a reference to a legal tool used by another major economy to investigate and respond to unfair trade practices. This would give the EU the ability to impose tariffs or other measures more quickly in response to perceived distortions.

Germany, Poland, the Netherlands and Belgium have reportedly backed Macron’s call for new EU powers to move faster on tariffs targeting China. Their support points to emerging alignment among several member states around the need for more agile instruments, even as views across the bloc remain varied.

Alongside debate over tariffs, the European Commission is weighing new rules to reduce dependence on single suppliers in critical areas. One proposal under consideration is a law that could require companies in sensitive sectors to diversify key supplies to at least three sources.

Such a requirement would aim to strengthen resilience in strategic supply chains by limiting exposure to any one country or supplier. It would also frame the EU’s response to trade imbalances not only in terms of defensive measures but also through structural changes to procurement and sourcing.

The EU has already taken notable steps targeting specific Chinese exports. In 2024, it imposed tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, reflecting concerns about competitive conditions in that industry.

In addition to the EV tariffs, the bloc has launched anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations into Chinese firms. These probes are part of a broader toolkit the EU is using to examine whether Chinese companies benefit from unfair support and to determine possible countermeasures.

Together, the widening trade gap, calls for new legal tools, potential supply-chain legislation, and existing tariffs and investigations illustrate an evolving EU strategy on economic relations with China. Policymakers are seeking ways to address rising frictions while managing the broader implications for trade and investment ties.