FCC bans China labs from US device testing

The Federal Communications Commission has approved an order that will prohibit every test laboratory in mainland China from certifying devices for sale in the United States. The decision targets the FCC equipment authorization pipeline, requiring that by December 1, 2028 manufacturers route their testing through labs located in countries that offer reciprocal market access to U.S. testing entities, a condition China does not satisfy.

Under the order, the FCC will no longer recognize test labs, telecommunications certification bodies, or laboratory accreditation bodies located in non‑reciprocal jurisdictions. The geographic and reciprocity-based standard applies regardless of facility ownership or control.

Chinese facilities currently handle 82 percent of all FCC equipment authorization applications, even though only 25.1 percent of recognized test labs are in mainland China. U.S. labs account for 17.9 percent of recognized labs but conduct fewer than 4 percent of actual authorization testing, reflecting the migration of electronics manufacturing and associated testing capacity toward China over the past two decades.

Because FCC equipment authorization is required for virtually every wireless or electronically emitting device marketed in the U.S., the ban’s impact will extend across smartphones, laptops, routers, IoT devices, drones, and medical equipment. Manufacturers that now rely on Chinese labs for cost and proximity reasons will need to secure compliant alternatives in economies recognized as reciprocal.

The order starts a transition period that runs until December 1, 2028, giving companies 25 months to reconfigure their testing supply chains. A U.S. lab owner estimates that Chinese facilities currently price testing 30 to 70 percent below comparable U.S. labs, suggesting that rerouting work could significantly raise compliance costs for device makers.

Alternatives include labs in Taiwan, which host 18.4 percent of recognized facilities, as well as labs in the United States and the European Union. However, existing capacity outside China was not built to absorb the testing volume now handled by Chinese labs, making future capacity expansion a central issue for the transition.

Six major trade groups in telecommunications, consumer technology, and manufacturing argued that restrictions should focus on ownership or control rather than geography. They warned that a location-based ban could reduce global testing capacity, delay product market entry, and increase costs for manufacturers that depend on fast, low-cost certification.

The FCC paired the order with a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that asks how to rebuild domestic testing capacity. The proceeding will explore potential mechanisms to expand U.S. and allied testing infrastructure, but the order itself does not specify how such expansion will be achieved.

The FCC’s security concerns include both specific cases of improper testing and broader exposure of technical data. It previously decertified a set of Chinese facilities, including SLG-CPC Test Laboratory, after finding 33 incorrect or false test reports, as well as Shenzhen STS Test Services for willfully providing incorrect or false equipment test results in equipment authorization applications.

The agency is also concerned that Chinese law obligates organizations in China to cooperate with intelligence activities. Because FCC authorization involves sharing detailed technical specifications and circuit designs with test labs, the FCC views continued reliance on Chinese facilities as a structural risk beyond isolated testing errors.

At the same meeting, the FCC adopted an overhaul of Section 214 rules that govern international telecommunications carriers. The changes lower the reportable ownership threshold for equity or voting interests to 5 percent and require expanded disclosure in applications for new authority, modifications, assignments, or transfers of control.

All existing Section 214 authorization holders must provide a one-time information filing detailing ownership structures, cross-border facilities, current and planned services, geographic markets, relationships with managed service providers linked to foreign adversaries, cybersecurity program certifications, and compliance with the FCC’s Covered List of prohibited equipment and services.